TL;DR
Stefan and Jens questioned whether “pure” dev tool companies can survive. Their conclusion: enterprise sales are unavoidable, low-cost SaaS is harder than it looks, and luck shapes outcomes more than most founders admit.
From self-serve dreams to enterprise reality
Jens recalled that when WunderGraph started, he wanted a pure self-serve model—no sales, just sign-ups. Over time he concluded that “there are no dev tool startups, at least not those who survive,” and challenged listeners to name ones thriving past Series B.
There are no dev tool startups, at least not those who survive… do you know any real dev tool company at a Series B actually thriving?
Defining what counts as a dev tool
Stefan and Jens debated examples. Supabase and Neon look like dev tools, but Stef noted they’re effectively competing in hosted Postgres and AI workloads now; even Vercel, once squarely dev-tool-branded, sits in a different category at their scale.
Are Vercel and Supabase still dev tools?
The hosts pressed on whether today’s biggest names even qualify as dev tools anymore. Stefan argued that once companies like Vercel reach massive brand scale, they’re no longer just developer products but full platforms. Supabase and Neon began in the dev tool bucket, but both leaned hard into hosted Postgres and broader workloads. Jens’s point: the lines blur quickly, and almost no one stays a “pure dev tool” for long.
Pricing lessons the hard way
Stefan shared how $25/month customers often demanded SLAs or full-year refunds during outages—counterintuitively, the cheapest plans were the hardest relationships.
It’s actually harder to sell a cheaper product than it is a more expensive product.
Why $8/month is a trap (the math)
Jens walked through the support math on tiny price points (referencing a creator’s “$8/month” post): even at 1,000–10,000 customers, the support load vs. ARR doesn’t pencil out.
Who treats you better?
Jens also observed a correlation: customers who pay more tend to treat you with more respect; the worst interactions came from aggressive discounters.
Enterprise isn’t about bigger checks — it’s about leverage
Jens reframed “go enterprise” as delivering greater value to groups: enabling 100 people to accomplish a goal together creates leverage, which then supports pricing.
You go into enterprise because you can bring more value to them… so much more leverage in creating value.
The underappreciated role of luck
Stefan argued that luck and timing are rarely acknowledged: Slack emerged from a failed game project’s internal chat; many famous companies stumbled into big markets. He also credits timing for WunderGraph’s pivot to federation as customers started demanding it.
All advice is B.S.—there’s survivorship bias… The best way is to experiment.
Looking ahead
The episode closed on a pragmatic note: there’s no guaranteed playbook. Advice is shaped by survivorship bias, and timing and luck often decide outcomes. Stefan’s takeaway was simple—experimentation beats theory.
This episode was directed by Jacob Javor. Transcript lightly edited for clarity and flow.
